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Note
Medical Payment Subrogation and
the Tort-Feasor's Waiver of the
Settlement Defense:
Unanswered Questions in
Nebraska
State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 204 Neb. 414, 282
N.W.2d 601 (1979).
I. INTRODUCTION
At first glance, State Automobile and Casualty Underwriters v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange,' appears to be a routine pleading
case wherein the plaintiff's attempt to enforce its subrogation
claim was dismissed because of its failure to allege the necessary
array of facts comprising its cause of action. An examination of the
case's history, however, reveals a discrepancy between the propo-
sition advanced by the plaintiff and the basis upon which the case
was decided. In fact, it appears that although the plaintiff argued
the case under one theory, the court used another with which to
dispose of it, thereby refraining from answering any of the sub-
stantive subrogation questions presented. When scrutinized, this
anomaly illustrates some of the subtleties of contemporary subro-
gation law and explains why State Auto left unanswered the ques-
tions of (1) whether an insurer may enforce its subrogation claim
against a tort-feasor notwithstanding the effectuation of a settle-
ment between the insured and the tort-feasor when the insurer
has previously paid part of the insured's loss and the tort-feasor
had notice thereof at the time of the settlement; and (2) whether
medical payment subrogation is valid in Nebraska.
1. 204 Neb. 414, 282 N.W.2d 601 (1979).
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II. FACTS
On December 22, 1977, the plaintiff, State Auto, filed suit against
defendants Clayton Kline and Farmers Insurance Exchange2 in
the District Court of Douglas County. The plaintiff alleged that on
June 28, 1974, Kurt Kardell, the plaintiff's insured, sustained prop-
erty damage and personal injuries when the car he was driving
was struck from the rear by a car driven by Kline.3 State Auto
further alleged that it paid Kardell a total of $7,225.89 pursuant to
the terms of his insurance policy and notified Kline and Farmers,
Kline's insurer "under a policy of insurance applicable to the
[a] ccident,"4 of its subrogation rights under the policy.5 The plain-
tiff finally averred that defendant Farmers, after notifying State
Auto of its refusal to honor medical payment subrogation, made a
payment of $10,303.16 to Kardell in settlement of the insured's
claims against Kline arising out of the accident.6 After this and
two substantially similar petitions7 were dismissed upon demurrer
at trial, State Auto elected to stand upon its second amended peti-
tion and appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.8
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE INSURANCE ISSUE
Attempts by plaintiff insurance carriers to recover payments
made to their insureds from tort-feasors and their insurers when
the tort-feasors' insurers have settled with the plaintiff's insured in
2. Actually, the plaintiff originally joined its insured, Kardell, as a party defend-
ant. However, its second amended petition joined only Kline and Farmers so
the case on appeal involved only those two defendants. Record at 67, State
Auto and Cas. Underwriters v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 204 Neb. 414, 282 N.W.2d
601 (1979).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 3.
5. The subrogation clause provided:
SUBROGATION. In the event of any payment under Coverage C-1
of this policy, the company shall be subrogated to the rights of recov-
ery therefor which the insured person or anyone receiving such pay-
ment may have against any person or organization and such person
shall execute and deliver instruments and papers and do whatever
else is necessary to secure such rights. Such persons shall do noth-
ing after loss to prejudice such rights.
Id. at 68.
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. The plaintiffs first amended petition added the allegation that its payments
to Kardell completely satisfied his claim for medical expenses and loss of in-
come. Record at 34. It also featured an altered ad damnum clause which
prayed for recovery only against Farmers (the original petition sought recov-
ery from both defendants). Id. at 35. The plaintiffs second amended petition
deleted the allegation that its payment had fully satisfied Kardell's claim for
medical expenses and loss of income. Id. at 68.
8. Id. at 91.
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disregard of the plaintiff's subrogation claim have spawned litiga-
tion since the turn of the century. While most courts have en-
forced the plaintiffs' otherwise valid subrogation claim in these
instances, they have done so only after addressing numerous de-
fenses interposed by the defendants, most relating in some way to
the settlement.9 Courts willing to enforce the subrogation interest
9. See, e.g., Collins v. Mobile & Ohio R.R. Co., 210 Ala. 234, 97 So. 631 (1923) (a
settlement with the insured was no defense when made with knowledge of an
insurance adjustment and with knowledge of a statute expressly allowing the
assignment of such claims); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 128 Ga. App. 872, 198
S.E.2d 346 (1973) (a general release executed by the insured had no adverse
effect upon the insurer's subrogation claim when the insurer was without
knowledge of the release and the tort-feasor's insurer had actual knowledge
of the subrogation claim at the time of settlement); Home Ins. Co. v. Hertz
Corp., 71 IM. 2d 210, 375 N.E.2d 115 (1978) (a general release running from the
insured to the tort-feasor and his insurance carrier does not bar a subsequent
subrogation action if the release was effected with knowledge of the insurer-
subrogee's interest); Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 94 So. 2d 92 (La.
App. 1957) (payment to the insured for the amount of loss in excess of his
insurance does not defeat the insurer's subrogation claim when done with
full knowledge that the insured had settled previously with his insurance
company); Cleaveland v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co,, 225 Md. 47, 169 A.2d
446 (1961) (tort-feasor could not claim the benefit of a release when it was on
notice that the release purported to extinguish the claim of a non-party sub-
rogee); Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 263 N.W. 729 (1935)
(by a settlement made with full knowledge, the tort-feasor was held to have
acquiesced in the splitting of the causes of action which were thus no bar to
the plaintiff's recovery); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 245
N.W.2d 844 (1976) (the tort-feasor waives his right to invoke the rule against
splitting a single cause of action where he has notice of the insurer's subroga-
tion claim prior to settling with the insured); Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Meggs, 229 So. 2d 823 (Miss. 1969) (dismissal of insurer's claim was error
when the tort-feasor had notice of the insurer's rights at the time of settle-
ment); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Raton Nat. Gas Co., 86 N.M. 160,
521 P.2d 122 (1974) (where the tort-feasor entered into the settlement with
full knowledge of the insurer's subrogation claim, the insurer's rights cannot
be defeated by legal proceedings between the tort-feasor and the insured);
Kozlowski v. Briggs Leasing Corp., 96 Misc. 2d 337, 408 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1978)
(an attempted destruction or derogation of an insurer's subrogation claim
will not have its intended effect where the tort-feasor had, or through reason-
able inquiry should have had, notice of the subrogation rights); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 268 N.C. 503, 151 S.E.2d 14 (1966)
(consent judgement obtained by insured will not bar an insurer's right of ac-
tion against the tort-feasor when the tort-feasor made the settlement with
knowledge of the insurer's subrogation claim); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v.
Elliott, 32 Ohio App. 2d 281, 290 N.E.2d 919 (1972) (a tort-feasor who settled
with full awareness of the subrogation interest is liable to the subrogee for
the amount paid by such subrogee); Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins.
Co., 101 RLL 708, 227 A.2d 105 (1967) (release procured by a tort-feasor aware
of the subrogation claim constitutes no defense to a subsequent action by the
insurer to enforce that claim); Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Ins. Co., 480 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (tort-feasor who has been made
aware of the insurer's subrogation interest cannot destroy that claim by en-
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usually do so in the following manner: they acknowledge at the
outset the fundamental tenet that the rights of a subrogor can rise
no higher than the rights of its subrogee as against a third party.'0
They also recognize that the insurer's subrogation rights will gen-
erally abate to the extent that the settlement and general release
executed between insured and tort-feasor extinguishes the in-
sured's claim." Thus, settlement is ordinarily a bar to the subro-
gor's claim against the tort-feasor and his or her insurer.12 In a
related vein, most courts agree that enforcement of the subroga-
tion interest would impermissibly split the insured's original cause
of action.1 3
However, courts often remain willing to enforce the subrogation
claim when the settlement was effectuated by the tort-feasor in
disregard of the subrogation interest. Enforcement of the claim is
proper, the reasoning goes, because by settling with notice of the
subrogation interest, the tort-feasor and his or her insurer are
deemed to have waived the right to raise the settlement as a de-
fense.14 Likewise, by disregarding the insurer's interest, the tort-
feasor is considered to have consented to a splitting of the cause of
action.15
tering into a settlement with and obtaining a release from the company's in-
sured); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972) (if
the settlement was made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of the sub-
rogation claim, it is a fraud upon the insurer and will not affect the subroga-
tion right); Lizotte v. Lizotte, 15 Wash. App. 622, 551 P.2d 137 (1976) (an
insured's release of a wrongdoer from liability cannot defeat the insurer's
rights when the wrongdoer had knowledge of the subrogation right).
10. E.g., Stetina v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 196 Neb. 441, 446, 243 N.W.2d
341, 344 (1976).
11. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 102, 106 (1963).
12. 6A J. APPLEMAN, INsURANcE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4092 (rev. ed. 1972).
13. Because the rule against splitting a cause of action is a facet of res judicata
and is designed to avoid a multiplicity of law suits, giving a settlement short
of judgment the effect of res judicata means that the plaintiff cannot litigate a
claim which was subsumed in the earlier settlement. See C. CLARK, HAND-
BOOK OF TnE LAw OF CODE PLEADING, 472 (2d ed. 1947).
14. In Cleaveland v. Chesepeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 225 M.D. 47, 169 A.2d 446
(1960) it was observed:
The cases and text writers generally take the position that where
third parties, who may be liable to an insured for a loss, effect a set-
tlement with the latter and obtain a release from all liability with
knowledge of the fact that an insurer has already paid the amount of
its liability to an insured, the settlement and release will not bar the
assertion of the insurer's right of subrogation.
Id. at 51, 169 A.2d at 448.
15. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Vaccari, 310 Minn. 97, 245 N.W.2d 844 (1976) illustrates
the typical response to the tort-feasor's defense that a cause of action should
not be split-
Since one of the principal reasons for the rule against splitting ac-
tions is to protect a defendant from unnecessary litigation and cost,
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This analysis presupposes the viability of the subrogation inter-
est. When the subrogation claim relates to medical payments,
some jurisdictions reach the opposite result and hold that the sub-
rogation clause runs afoul of the common law rule prohibiting as-
signment of personal injury claims. 16 By distinguishing
assignment from subrogation, however, most courts have enforced
the medical payment subrogation clause.' 7
The reasoning of one case which State Auto used to support its
claim for subrogation is atypical of the reasoning employed by
courts which choose to enforce the medical payment subrogation
clause despite a settlement with notice. In Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. Vaccari,18 the plaintiff insurer paid the insured for certain
medical expenses and informed the defendant tort-feasor and his
insurer of the insurer's subrogation claim. The defendants paid
the insured $10,000 and obtained a general release from her. In the
suit by the insured's subrogee to enforce its claim against the tort-
feasor and its insurance company, the court was called upon to
consider the effect of the settlement on the subrogee's right of re-
covery. Holding that the insurer's claim was enforceable, the court
the defendant waives this protection if, with notice of an insurer's
claim, he voluntarily enters into a separate settlement with the in-
sured. We also note that some courts have simply held that the rule
against splitting a cause of action does not apply to an insurer's sub-
rogation interest.
Id. at 101, 245 N.W.2d at 847. See also CLARK, supra note 13, at 479.
16. Most jurisdictions hold that personal injury claims cannot be assigned absent
statutory authorization. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955); see also W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 619 (4th ed. 1971). Some courts have found
medical payment subrogation clauses to be violative of this common law rule.
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Druke, 118 Ariz. 301, 576 P.2d 489 (1978); Peller v. Lib-
erty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App.2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1963); Travelers
Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965).
17. The basis for distinguishing subrogation from assignment is generally said to
be that subrogation arises from a pre-existing duty to compensate the injured
party, whereas assignment involves a transfer of the claim after the fact. The
danger of champerty or inciting the entrance of officious intermeddlers is not
enhanced by allowing subrogation. See, e.g., DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut.
Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. App. 1966), Annot., 19 A.L.R. 3d 1054 (1968).
18. 10 Minn. 97, 245 N.W.2d 844 (1976). Another case relied upon by State Auto is
significant in that it relied heavily upon policy considerations, finding the
ramifications of a refusal to enforce the clause repugnant:
In short, adoption of... [a rule allowing the insurer recourse only
against its own insured] would (1) permit the tortfeasor to escape
liability for the amounts paid by the insurer, (2) require the tort vic-
tim to go uncompensated as to the amounts paid by the insurer even
though he has paid insurance premiums and has also suffered loss at
the hands of the tortfeasor defendant, (3) force the insurer to sue his
own injured insured, and (4) place a premium on sharp practice and
dishonesty.
Home Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 71 Ill. 2d 210, 375 N.E.2d 115, (1978).
[Vol. 59:758
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dismissed arguments that enforcement of the interest would con-
stitute an invalid assignment of a personal injury claim1 9 and im-
permissibly split the insured's cause of action.20 Finding these
objections were outweighed by the equitable consideration that as
between wrongdoer and insurer, the former should be made to
pay,21 the court evaluated the effect of the settlement as follows:
To hold that such a settlement destroys an insurer's subrogation rights
would have the practical effect of encouraging a tortfeasor or his liability
insurer to disregard notice of an insurer's valid subrogation claim and at-
tempt to procure a general release from the insured. We believe that the
tortfeasor and his liability insurer have a duty to act in good faith under
such circumstances. Therefore we hold that where a tortfeasor and his
liability insurer willfully disregard notice of the subrogation claim of the
insured person's insurer and enter into a separate settlement with the in-
sured person, such a settlement does not defeat his insurer's subrogation
right.22
In ruling that the settlement was no bar to the enforcement of
the insurer's subrogation claim, the court in Vaccari analyzed the
tort-feasor's procurement of the release with knowledge of the sub-
rogee's interest in terms of fraud,23 as numerous other courts had
done. Viewed as a fraud upon the insurer, the settlement or re-
lease was voided as a defense against the insurer. Regardless of
whether the tort-feasor's act is analyzed in terms of fraud or
waiver, the result is largely the same: the insurer is allowed to
pursue its right of subrogation despite the settlement.
19. See note 17 supra.
20. See note 15 supra.
21. A strong undercurrent manifested in many of the cases, equitable balancing,
is typified by the oft-quoted statement that
a wrongdoer who is legally responsible for harm should not receive
the windfall of being absolved from liability because the insured had
had the foresight to obtain, and had paid the expense of procuring,
insurance for his protection; since the insured has already been paid
for his harm, the liability of the third person should now inure for the
benefit of the insurer.
16 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 61:18 (2d ed. 1966) (footnote
omitted).
22. 310 Minn. at 103, 245 N.W.2d at 848.
23. The term "fraud" has crept into a number of opinions discussing the effect of
settlement on the insurer's right of subrogation. See, e.g., Sentry Ins. Co. v.
Stuart, 246 Ark. 680, 686, 439 S.W.2d 797, 800 (1969); Home Ins. Co. v. Hertz
Corp., 71 Ill. App. 2d 210, 215, 375 N.E.2d 115, 118 (1978); Cleaveland v. Chesa-
peake & Potomac Tel. Co., 225 Md. 47, 51, 169 A.2d 446, 448 (1960); Wolverine
Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 496, 263 N.W. 724, 725 (1935); Hospital
Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 101 R.I. 708, 718, 227 A.2d 105, 112 (1967);
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 2d 101, 106, 505 P.2d 783, 787 (1972).
As "fraud" is a generic term, susceptible of several meanings, it is argua-
bly preferable in the interest of clarity to characterize the tort-feasor's action
as a waiver. In fact, State Auto's failure to recover in this action derives in
part from its interpretation of "fraud" as the term was used in Vaccari.
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Nebraska's position regarding these issues is not entirely
clear.24 Omaha & Republication Valley Railway v. Granite State
Fire Insurance Co.,25 is widely cited for the proposition that a set-
tlement with notice of the insurer-subrogee's interest affords the
tort-feasor no defense in a subsequent action by the insurer. In-
deed, the case may represent good authority for that posi-
tion 26although it has a stronger factual basis for compelling such a
result than most courts enjoy when addressing the issue.27 Gran-
ite State did not concern medical payment subrogation, however,
24. Elsewhere in the subrogation context, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held
that absent other factors, when the payment by the insurer covers only a por-
tion of the damages the insured retains the right of action for the entire
amount, reasoning that "the wrongful act was single and indivisible, and
gives rise to but one liability. Upon this theory the splitting of causes of action
is avoided and the wrongdoer is not subjected to a multiplicity of suits."
Krause v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 184 Neb. 588, 593, 169 N.W.2d 601,
604 (1969) (emphasis by the court) (citation omitted).
Regarding the possible effect of Nebraska's real party in interest statute
(NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-301 (Reissue 1977)) upon an action by the subrogee,
Schmidt v. Henke, 192 Neb. 408, 222 N.W.2d 114 (1974) seems to establish only
that the use of a loan receipt agreement effectively preserves the entire cause
of action in the insured for purposes of the statute. When a subrogation
clause is involved, Jelinek v. Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 196 Neb. 488, 243
N.W.2d 778 (1976), holds that an insurer becomes the only real party in inter-
est after it pays its insured for the full amount of the loss.
25. 53 Neb. 514, 73 N.W. 950 (1898). In Granite State the insured brought suit
against the tort-feasor "alledging the loss of his property through its negli-
gence, its value as $3,900, and the insurance and payment to him of $1,000 by
the insurance company, and prayed damages for $2,900." Id. at 518, 73 N.W. at
950. The tort-feasor's answer alleged that because the $1,000 had been as-
signed to the insurer and the remainder to another party, the insured was no
longer a real party in interest. At this point the tort-feasor chose to abandon
its assignment defense and settled with the insured. A verdict was returned
and a judgment entered upon the settlement for $1,750. When the insurer
subsequently brought an action to recover its $1,000 claim, the tort-feasor
pleaded the settlement as a defense even though it had initially asserted this
very assignment to the insurer as a defense in the insured's previous action.
26. In Granite State, the court offered the following observations about the
tortfeasor's position in these instances:
Knowing as it [the tort-feasori then knew, of the rights of the insur-
ance company, it is not protected, by that voluntary payment of...
[the insured's] claim, against a valid claim of the insurance company
not included in that settlement. Its action was equivalent to express
consent to a splitting of the cause of action, and it can claim no estop-
pel against the insurance company because it acted with full knowl-
edge of its rights and of its intention to assert them.
Id. at 519-20, 73 N.W. at 951.
27. In Granite State, the tort-feasor not only settled the preceding suit by the
insured with notice of the insurer's claim, but it defended that suit by alleg-
ing that the insured was not a real party in interest by virtue of its assign-
ments of the claim to the insurer and another party. In addition, the tort-
feasor had consented to judgment upon the settlement in the prior action
rendering the issue of fault res judicata. See note 25 supra.
[Vol. 59:758
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and no Nebraska case appears to have addressed the issue of
whether state courts will enforce medical payment subrogation
clauses.
IV. THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY
Although State Auto had ample authority for the proposition
that an insurer is not barred from enforcing its subrogation inter-
est against a tort-feasor who has knowingly settled with and ob-
tained a release from an insured in disregard of the subrogee's
claim, State Auto took the position that the cases which spoke in
terms of fraud as a means of avoiding the settlement stood for
something more. While its appellate brief was not entirely clear on
this point,28 State Auto seems to have posited that these cases es-
tablished a cause of action in tort arising directly out of the tort-
feasor's and its insurer's act of obtaining the release in disregard of
the insurer's subrogation claim.29 As this cause of action was in-
28. Taken alone, State Auto's appellate brief is particularly equivocal in its ex-
planation of its theory of recovery. For example, at one point it states that
"[b]ecause this settlement estops the tortfeasor from raising the splitting a
cause of action defense, the insurer's cause of action is not barred." Brief for
Appellant at 8, State Auto. and Cas. Underwriters v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 204
Neb. 414, 282 N.W.2d 601 (1979). Such a statement clearly implies that reli-
ance was being placed upon the insured's original claim. The argument that
a cause of action should not be split was inapposite if State Auto's claim was
independent of any claims its insured might have had against the tort-feasor.
On the other hand, State Auto's brief is not devoid of expression consistent
only with a cause of action independent of the subrogation interest. Its anal-
ogy to Granite State is instructive in this regard:
While the ... [tort-feasor] might have admitted liability in con-
senting to the entry against it in the earlier case and neither Kline
nor Farmers admitted liability in settling this action, there is no dif-
ference in the effect on the legal relation of the insurer and the
tortfeasor or tortfeasor's insurer. In both instances, the tortfeasor
knew of an insurer's subrogation interest before obtaining a release
of all claims, whether by consent judgment or settlement, from the
insured.
Id. at 9.
To the extent that the plaintiff contended that the tort-feasor's original lia-
bility was of no consequence, it necessarily repudiated subrogation as the
basis for the present action. Nevertheless, no clear articulation of State
Auto's theory appears on record until its motion for rehearing where it ar-
gued: 'This is not a case of subrogation grounded in rights of subrogation
arising out of a negligence cause of action. It is a constructive fraud action
which does not require that State Auto plead or prove facts constituting neg-
ligence in order to maintain its action against the defendants." Motion for
Rehearing at 3, State Auto. and Cas. Underwriters v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 204
Neb. 414, 282 N.W.2d 601 (1979).
29. Both parties chose to call the asserted tort "fraud," apparently because of the
use of that term by the authorities enlisted in support of State Auto's posi-
tion. Motion for Rehearing at 4, n.2, Brief for Appellee at 25; see note 12 &
accompanying text supra. Although the parameters of such an action are, of
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dependent of any claims which its insured may originally have had
against the tort-feasor, it was not extinguished by the settlement
as was the claim of its insured. Instead, it developed as a direct
result of the settlement due to the tort-feasor's so-called fraudu-
lent conduct. Under this line of reasoning, any fault which might
have initially rendered the tort-feasor liable to the insured was ir-
relevant to the insurer's claim and thus did not constitute an ele-
ment of its cause of action.30 Accordingly, the plaintiff's petition
made no pretense of alleging Kline's negligence. Consistent with
this theory of relief, State Auto joined both Kline and Farmers as
parties defendant, presumably considering them joint tort-feasors
as both had knowledge of the subrogee's interest prior to the set-
tlement.3 '
It is safe to say that this position actually represented an exten-
sion of existing precedent from Nebraska and every other jurisdic-
tion.32 While many cases, including Vaccari, have mentioned
course, as of yet undefined, State Auto identified four elements which it con-
sidered the basis of its claim: (1) the tort-feasor injures the insured; (2) the
insurer pays the insured; (3) the insurer notifies the tort-feasor of its subro-
gation rights accruing from such payment; and (4) the tort-feasor settles with
the insured for a general release in disregard of the insurer's rights. Brief for
Appellant at 7-8. Given these elements, no compelling reason for denominat-
ing such an action as "fraud" are apparent. The tort, if recognized, would be
one with characteristics unique to the law of subrogation. It need not even be
an intentional tort. Cf. National Ins. Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595
F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979) (discussing a similar action in terms of negligence).
30. Brief for Appellant at 9. See note 29 supra.
31. Direct actions against liability insurance carriers qua liability insurers are
not allowed in Nebraska. Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb.
752, 765, 229 N.W.2d 183, 190 (1975). This is precisely what State Auto was
attempting to do by suing Farmer's to enforce its subrogation claim. Unless
one is willing to assume that the plaintiff was unaware of Nebraska law on
that question, a brave supposition to make about an insurance company do-
ing business in Nebraska, the joinder of Farmers is a further indication that
the plaintiff's claim was distinct from its subrogation interest.
32. While State Auto's claim has yet to gain judicial approval, it is not an entirely
novel contention, a similar argument apparently having been posed in Na-
tional Ins. Underwriters v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 595 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1979)
where it was observed:
The Colorado courts have not addressed the question of whether
the failure to protect a known subrogation interest would support an
action for negligence. In fact, we are unable to find any state which
has allowed such an action. The courts hold instead that where a
release obtained from the insurer with knowledge that the latter has
already been indemnified by the insurer, such release does not nec-
essarily bar the right of subrogation of the insurer.... This is the
typical solution, and apparently the only "remedy" afforded in such a
situation. It is one thing to hold that the release executed under such
circumstances is invalid as to the insurer, but quite another to rule
that a breach of its "duty" to protect a subrogation interest would
support an action for negligence. The Colorado courts have not gone
[Vol. 59:758
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fraud as a basis for their holding, the term has never been used to
signify a distinct cause of action. It is used as a means of voiding
the settlement as a defense.33 Even so, the plaintiffs argument
was premised upon a plausible interpretation of existing cases3 4
and may well have been commended by sound policy considera-
tions.35 In essence though, the Nebraska Supreme Court was be-
ing asked to take a step beyond the bounds of existing authority by
making an adjudication of fraud, not merely as a device with which
to void any defenses otherwise available to the tort-feasor, but as
an independent basis of affirmative relief.
V. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
By sustaining a demurrer to State Auto's original petition, the
District Court clearly passed upon the merits of the plaintiff's the-
ory. Apparently considering that the action pursued by State Auto
was unsupported by Nebraska precedent, the court dismissed, not-
ing:
It is the court's opinion that plaintiff's only recourse is against its own in-
sured and that notice to a tort-feasor or his insurance carrier cannot give
rise to a cause of action or an estoppel since no duty exists for said parties
to protect anything and that notice in and of itself does not give rise to an
action for fraud.
3 6
Distinguishing Granite State because "the insurance company in
that case waived its right to a valid defense by consenting to judg-
ment,"37 the trial court found Schmidt v. Henke,38 another Ne-
so far as to allow such a negligence action. Also there is no support
from other jurisdictions for such a result, and we must hold that
there would be no such cause of action provided in the Colorado
courts.
Id. at 551 (citations omitted).
33. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
34. Since Minnesota, like Nebraska, proscribes direct actions against liability in-
surers, see note 31 supra, the fact that the court in Vaccari granted recovery
directly against the tort-feasor's liability insurer, the insurer having been
joined as a co-defendant, is supportive of the plaintiffs interpretation of that
case.
35. For example, State Auto argued that in instances where a settlement had
already been effectuated, it would be self-defeating to require that the issue
of negligence later be litigated between insurers. 'This obviously results in
multiplicity and increased complexity of actions no matter how clear the tort
feasor's liability which, in cases such as this, has resulted in a settlement
rather than litigation between the parties to the accident." Motion for Re-
hearing at 3-4.
36. Record at 29.
37. Id. at 30.
38. 192 Neb. 408, 222 N.W.2d 114 (1974). The case is probably distinguishable in
that it involved the execution of a loan receipt instead of the use of a subroga-
tion clause. When given legal effect by courts, loan receipts operate in a
much different manner than subrogation, being designed to keep the entire
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braska insurance case, controlling.39
After having two amended petitions dismissed upon demurrer 4O
State Auto appealed but fared no better before the Nebraska
Supreme Court. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment,
agreeing that the plaintiff had failed to "state a cause of action on
the merits under any theory against either or both defendants."'4 1
However, the means by which the Nebraska Supreme Court
reached this conclusion bore no semblance to the lower court's
reasoning since the appellate court completely abstained from ad-
dressing the substantive issues. Instead, the court shifted its focus
to the plaintiff's second amended petition and affirmed strictly on
the basis of that pleading.
By re-examining the plaintiff's petition and finding it wanting,
the court appeared oblivious to the theory of relief actually pro-
pounded by State Auto. Instead, it chose to measure the suffi-
ciency of the plaintiffs petition under the assumption that State
Auto actually sought to enforce its subrogation claim and accord-
ingly proceeded to "identify the actionable facts necessary to plead
a cause of action to enforce rights of subrogation."42 Because the
tort-feasor's negligence would have been crucial to such a subroga-
tion claim, the court naturally found the plaintiff's petition fatally
defective.4 3 Throughout the course of the opinion, no direct refer-
ence was made to any theory resembling the action which had
been advocated by State Auto.
VI. THE COURT'S ACTION
As a preliminary matter, it is not clear whether the court actu-
ally understood the nature of the plaintiff's theory. While the pro-
cause of action in the insured. Schmidt merely seems to recognize the valid-
ity of this device in Nebraska.
39. Record at 30.
40. Id. at 66, 87. Both amendments involved only minor changes in the plaintiffs
petition. See note 7 supra.
41. 204 Neb. at 418, 282 N.W.2d at 604.
42. Id. at 416, 282 N.W.2d at 603.
43. The court found three things objectionable about the plaintiffs petition:
[T] he petition alleges no facts supporting a cause of action for negli-
gence on behalf of its insured Kardell against either defendant; it
does not allege in any way that Farmers had issued to the apparent
tort-feasor, Kline, a policy of liability insurance; and, finally, the
prayer of the petition is only against Farmers.
Id. at 415, 282 N.W.2d at 603 (emphasis by the court). Since the omission of a
prayer for relief is not demurrable in Nebraska, Majerus v. Santo, 143 Neb.
774, 10 N.W.2d 608 (1943), the only basis for dismissal as against Kline appar-
ently was the failure to allege negligence. With regard to Farmers, the court
appears to have dismissed primarily because of the absence of a direct action
statute in Nebraska. 204 Neb. at 417, 282 N.W.2d at 604. See note 31 supra.
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priety of the court's mode of decision is questionable if it was
cognizant of State Auto's claim, as some indications suggest,44 it is
equally possible that the court was never adequately apprised of
the plaintiff's position,45 in which case the onus of the communica-
tion failure rightfully devolved upon State Auto as the moving
party. In either event, the substantive questions which were put at
issue by State Auto's claim were left unresolved by the court's ad-
judication.
Two subrogation issues which might otherwise have been
presented on the facts of State Auto, therefore, remain unsettled
in Nebraska. On the one hand, some uncertainty must reign as to
whether the court will follow other jurisdictions in holding that an
insurer is not barred from enforcing its subrogation claim against a
tort-feasor who has settled with the insured in disregard of the
subrogation interest despite the tort-feasor's knowledge of such an
interest.46 On the other hand, the viability of medical payment
subrogation in Nebraska also remains in doubt after State Auto.
44. For example, State Auto's brief did explicitly enumerate the elements which
the plaintiff considered necessary to its cause of action. See note 29 supra.
Also, the trial court's observation that "notice in and of itself does not give
rise to an action for fraud," Record at 29, suggests that a cause of action ex-
isting apart from State Auto's subrogation claim was contemplated below. Fi-
nally, the court seems to have been apprised of the nature of the plaintiff's
claim at oral argument as indicated by the plaintiffs motion for rehearing
where it was asserted:
This Court, contrary to its assertion that '[i]t is only through assump-
tion and elimination of alternatives that we are able to determine
that State Auto's alleged right of subrogation is founded in tort,'
asked at oral argument State Auto's theory of recovery and was
clearly told that it was a fraud theory.
Motion for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof at 3 n.1.
45. Indeed, by placing any amount of reliance upon the plaintiff's appellate brief,
as it was certainly justified in doing, the court may well have concluded that
State Auto was arguing for nothing more than the proposition that the tort-
feasor had waived his defense by settling with knowledge. The language em-
ployed by the brief implied as much in several instances. See, e.g., note 28
supra.
An inference that State Auto's cause of action was misperceived may also
be drawn from speculation in the supreme court's opinion that State Auto
might have been "claiming some sort of contract or estoppel theory." 204
Neb. at 417, 282 N.W.2d at 604. Such a theory, as discussed and ultimately
rejected by the court, bore only an attenuated relationship to the plaintiff's
argument since the court was referring to the situation where the tort-fea-
sor's insurance company assures the plaintiff that it will honor the subroga-
tion claim and then pleads the statute of limitations after the plaintiff has
waited in reliance upon the representation. While inapposite to the instant
case, the court's conjecture does seem to represent an effort to discern some
cause of action independent of the subrogation claim.
46. See note 9 supra.
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Although Granite State47 is plausible authority for the proposition
that by settling with notice a tort-feasor waives any defenses
otherwise arising from the settlement, its vintage and unique fac-
tual underpinning may detract somewhat from its value.4 While
the facts of State Auto would seemingly have afforded the court an
opportunity to meet this issue directly, the plaintiffs failure or re-
fusal to plead the facts requisite to such a waiver theory effectively
precluded the consideration of this question by the court.49 The
waiver doctrine espoused by other jurisdictions thus has yet to re-
ceive an unqualified endorsement by the courts of this state. Nev-
ertheless, in light of the widespread support garnered by this
doctrine and the apparent support given it by Granite State, the
court might well be expected to vindicate such a theory when the
issue is squarely presented.
The validity of medical payment subrogation, the other issue
left undecided by State Auto, probably presents a closer question.
Because the enforceability of the medical payment subrogation
clause was a necessary precondition to the plaintiff's recovery
under any theory, its resolution could be avoided only by failing to
reach the merits of the case,5 0 which of course is precisely what
happened. While a disposal of the action in this manner might be-
lie a reluctance on the court's behalf to sanction medical payment
subrogation, the court's action more probably represents an un-
47. 53 Neb. 514, 73 N.W. 950 (1898).
48. See note 27 supra. While the case is an 1898 decision, it does not appear to
have since been undermined by any court or legislative action.
49. It is less than clear whether the plaintiff's claim represented a deliberate ef-
fort to change existing case law or whether it merely reflected a genuine be-
lief that the case supported its claim.
The possibility that the plaintiff was somewhat uncertain as to the con-
fines of its own "constructive fraud" theory is worth noting. Arguing in terms
of estoppel and waiver of splitting defenses, see note 28 & accompanying text
supra, necessarily implied a direct reliance upon the original subrogation in-
terest, a position fundamentally inconsistent with its refusal to plead negli-
gence. Indeed, the plaintiffs first explicit repudiation of an intent to enforce
the subrogation interest did not occur until its motion for rehearing. See note
44 supra.
Alternatively, State Auto may have been fully aware of the fact that no
precedent directly supported its theory and consciously chose to couch its
argument in more familiar terms in order to minimize the appearance that its
theory was truly unprecedented. If such is the case, the tactic obviously
backfired since the court appears to have interpreted the cases cited in State
Auto's brief to stand for their generally accepted meaning. See note 42 & ac-
companying text supra.
50. This is not entirely correct since the court could have recognized the plain-
tiffs substantive theory of constructive fraud and have rejected it while ex-
pressly refusing to reach the question of medical payment subrogation.
However, in order for the plaintiff to prevail, the validity of medical payment
subrogation necessarily required the court's blessing.
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willingness to pass upon an issue of such importance until it is
squarely presented.51 Explained thus, State Auto offers no clue as
to the court's predisposition regarding medical payment subroga-
tion. Moreover, the lack of unanimity displayed by other jurisdic-
tions addressing the question makes a forecast of the position to
be taken by the Nebraska Supreme Court difficult.52
VII. CONCLUSION
State Auto resolved none of the questions of substantive law
relating to subrogation even though an adjudication of the plain-
tiff's actual claim would have required the court to either pass
upon a somewhat novel question of "constructive fraud" or deter-
mine the validity of medical payment subrogation in Nebraska. To
this extent, the result of the case is unfortunate regardless of
whether one postulates that the court understood the plaintiff's
theory. It should be observed, however, that because the court
never disposed of the substantive questions at issue, State Auto
has foreclosed neither the enforceability of medical payment sub-
rogation clauses, the waivability of settlement defenses when ef-
fectuated with notice, or for that matter, the viability of the
"constructive fraud" theory.
William P. Connealy, '81
51. That this is an issue of considerable importance in Nebraska is evidenced by
the fact that the one amicus curiae brief filed was devoted almost exclusively
to the issue. See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Nebraska at 6-11, State Auto. and Cas. Underwriters v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
204 Neb. 414, 282 N.W.2d 601 (1979). The issue also received a thorough dis-
cussion by State Auto. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 2-11.
52. See note 16 supra.
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